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Properly  to  grasp  the  present.situation,  we  have  I  think  to 
dis tinguiph  three_  s~:-J}Ji~ra tc  v.rob:~?.ms, the  problem  o·f  the  pound,  the 
problem of intra-Coll!m'uni ty exchange  rates,  cll1d_  :the  problem of  the 
dollar...  · 
I  sh~ll not  enlarge  on  the  reasons  fo~ this situation.  The 
inter~bl  t~oti~les of  the  British  ~conomy,  the  debates  in Britain 
. itself OD;  a  _po.::-;sible  clw.n~_;;e  in  the  parity of  the  pound,  the  doubts 
voiced in m9-ny  quarters  there  o..s  to  ;3ri tain 's ability to  pa:ntic ipa te 
in  the  Co'mfiiurdty  monetary  agr<::en1ents,.  were- bound  to  trigger  specula-
tion  Q  ':J.1l1.e  scale  of  the  speculnti  ve .pressu-re  which  dt:veloped  in the 
sp&ce  of  a  fe~ days  was  due  to  the. role  of  the  City of  London in 
i.n teri1a tion.:.d.  financial  dealings. 
The  present  sterling  crisi~ therefore  does  not  come  aa  a 
complete  surprise:  the  fire  was  already  smouldering.  But  it does 
,plainly demonstrate  that  thcre.can  be  no  ignoring or.evading 
Britaip's  economic,  monotury  and  finuaciul  problems,  and.that  the 
··  sinoo th  functioning  O.J1d.  development  of  the  vnlarged  Community  will 
··depend  upon  thc;ir  being  tackled effectively  .• 
_The  Community  noted-with  Qnderst~nding the·steps Britain  found 
itself compollod  to  take.  ~hat matters  now  ~s thah  Britain should 
entar  the  Community  at  ~~e  beginning  of 1973-with ~ts exchange 
po.sit;i.on  ret;tor_o'd  to  nor·mal  vis-a-.vis its _partne:cs..  It will  then 
have  to _look  to  the  othei  memb~r countries  for  the ·assistance  to 
enable  it ·progr6ssively  to  overcome  its difficultiea. 
lrdlari~,  boihg  so  closely  linked  with  Jritain in monetary 
re~3pects,  h,,j  no _,:>l;tion  but to  .foll~··J  BriL--.:.:."'  •J  J:ine  .• 
Denmark,  struggling  with  balance  of  payments  difficulties, 
withdrew  temporarily  from  the  Basle  agreement  while ·abiding  by  the 
~ashington ~~r~~ments.  Norway  for  its part stood  by all its 
undertakings, 
•';II  ••  /  ···-· \~hut  Yl":i'"~· t.lk  f:lix  to  u..:.;';'  fl.t  l:h~;;ir  m;;.:ti.nl~  ut Luxembourg  Lhuy 
\h:ci\kd  to  ,,iH,,:rv,  tltl;'  ;tJ!d1in. t•)ll  d£;l'v.t:l•.·nt  on  ,.,,t,, d  r,f  ·XChan,,'.•J 1  anJ. 
to.  l·'uc':!,n.··  !.ri  fvr•a  ..... ;  t.lio  r·1on ·t·r·'  :u·P."cll1.•tr:>~rJ<:nL<:  ''  . .!:"l'ivud  at  i!1  ;v!arch  w1th.1.n  "  .  ~ .  .._  •  ,,  '"  .j 
th·:;  Communi 1 y • 
...  2\  :c;p•:t'iaJ  ::l'Cllddn  Ul'O<:i,  .!l,  th~.  c:.L.<  .. ·  cJl'  lL,l,y:  tlL:  flv~tll!c:.  01' 
the  pi)und  t'X)JOf';);-1  U~\J  Jir:;  i.';  l\.,:;a•  raidinr;  :.tnd  n  ;mb;d, .ntl  l  fli.g}d;  Of 
~Ct;IJ~~a:t_.  ~~\l_t- _tll•::.!  l ttrlic..n  :pc;~;ition_  ~vu.~~·  \-~lli tt.j  difft;j!r:ll L  r~on1  tin.J 
H1·it.ish  dnd  dJ.cl.  no!~  w~n-r~1td.  f'lo~.U.ng  t!;v  .U.r;:;..  It  L:;  tr·;t,;  th.::tt;  th•.;; 
1t.ulinn  O:.>GOHOinJ  1n  iwving its il'oubles  cJl'ld  Ulll':0rt:•inti<;;c;,  but  It<·.1;y's 
bi.diwc  ,,.  of  pi.,,Yllh' ll  t u  t:.,;  in  ,::;,u·plu:~; 1  it  G  ru  GO rv  '"  ~:>  :.,.r·.  \'1<-:.U.  :'!to c kc d 
1  nncl 
the  tl•,•nd  iti  ib; \.:xport  pri(~,;f;  lLL;  so  far  b·:;~;n  rnor•c.  L~votn·nb:L:  Uwn 
tilt.~ t  of  it:;.;  princip:.cl  pt!.l' bkl~s. 
~Jhvn  \\'(:  compare;  t.he  lirnitvd.  disadvantage:J  resulting  from  tho 
t0mporary  derogation  that  has  been  grunted  to  Italy  with  the  economic 
and polificnl disadvuntagos  that wouf'd  hn  VG  bt.!~;n  entailed  by  actually 
scrapping  the  2.25%  m~~gin,  we  6un  only  b~  thankful  at  the  course 
adopted.  Tho.  derogation .illi rospec·t  of  Italy is  simply  the  consequence 
~  .. q_.f_}} .  .ilii_fac  ~t£. G;i~.~~~ti9..n  ..  IJJh.~~·~ by_  ..  ~~e .qeY1t.,.';'D).  !J.~.z:.ks.' ~.g:o~.d  ito  frozon  and 
cannot  fulfil its function  aa the  medium  of international  settlements. 
·I  should he  the  1~nt to  claim  that  thismeans other difficulties 
will  no~t ·arJ.I3i)  ·in tho  .fu.tux:·,;~·.;;  ·  But  th<m;  nobody  over  supr.iosed  the 
mondt~ry or~anization of  the~aommrinit~ would  come  about at  the  wave  of 
a  wand.  Tho  machinery  of  tho  Basle  agreements  was  carefully  designed: 
it can  operate  among  the  Six,  but  orily  provided  the  Member  States are 
truit~resolvcd to  uphold  the  system  by  close solidarity  • 
. It cannot  bd  s~dd too  ofb.in  that· the  reason  speculatici:n so  often 
succ~ed.s ·is  that it ·is  concluC't:.:  .  .:d  in  th0,  expectation -that  th".:::  front  put 
up  agaj:ns  ti  it.  will crack:  spoculu. t:i.:on  :Ls  anything  but· ir:t•ational. 
)~by  should  tho  s_pecula tors  for:_<;o  making  a  profit if  thc~y. have:  every 
ch<;U1C•J'  of:  nian~.lging. to  do  so?'  ~;hy  should  they  beliovo  ;:tn  ~'<gr.:::·emt:nt 
will hold  firm  if they  know.  thu"t  at  th·-=· ·first impc:ct  j_t  wi1l  be  called 
in question  and  that  even  th0  pa~ti&s  to  it do  not  really expect it to 
last?·· 
Well,  at  ·Luxe·mbourg  tlw  Gix  ;;iembE:r  :::>t.:~tes  made  it; c'lea.r  that  they 
did  not .intend  to  go:  bo.ck  on  whc:t t.  they  hctd  mn11G  up  thtdr mind.s  to 
-:th:P~o·~onths ·J)(dor:::. •  'l'he  futur"'  hingeG  on  thei-r. continuing  to  display 
the  same  resolu ti.on. 
..  .  · Whct.t  .I  h<we  b0·r:n  sr..;.ying .e:'tpp'l'ies  l:ikevdse· to ·the  ~iashington agree-
mont:s1  that is,  to  the  dollar  probl.em~  ·  Crho  reas.on  why  the:se  agroe--
ment:;;  WCH'I;;  concluded ·rwvertht.:lo.s:s  wa's  that ~they put  an ·~n'd  to  u  state 
·  ,.  o.·f  a_ff.sdr.s  whi"ch  had  bt:,oc'omc· ·uritcn':3.ble. ·  ·The  countl'ics· whi-ch  had 
floated  their  currerici~s  w~re  indr~usingly worried at 1he  w~y their 
rates  a.ga:LnE>-t  ·t'he  :do1la;r  were  r.:i .  .sirt'g;.  th:e  countries· which  had  reacted 
by  imposing controls  were  having  to  clamp  them  on  tighter  and  tighter. 
All·had•bomb  tb  se0 the  imp6rtance  bf  estabiiahing and  preserving  a 
I~ r :1l<l. •"  1"-'  f':'l'!IG h.>\:u.i  U f' :i."Oetli.s.ti  C  !·•Yehal1~> ra  !cc:,_;  ~: "''L-~ •  ..;1'0  c)f  or  d-b r ly 
ad jus  tnwn t. 
~·  .:And  art  we  now  to  repud•iaL; ·.trw  still procn.rious  order  in 
monetary.n~ttors that  whs  so  laborious~y· restorad? - -- - --- ~  - - . 
.  In, it.  s:o  i.tnlJtH:H3.i.bie  ~o  uz:;ilold  the  vxr:hv.ngt:J  rdb0Il\  .:;;i:;tt:,bl.itd·lod  in 
Duc•:!rttfhH'  by  m:dtinv:  full  u;;  .. ;  ·:Yf  Uw  ·~:i•i H'  tnnrgin  of f1uctiJafiQ11  ::teD.i11t;C 
th\:1  ~d<Jll~;n' i  by  m~1rlipul"'•tine;  in  t.;·!'<;ot -r<.\Ll~6;  tmd  by  wh:lding--t~"lf·  ..... ·-·-· 
vnl':i.<)un  I'Jt~~~r-o nn  a V!J:Uab Jc  f~:yr. r '·' .:hw irl, ·  h1f  lo\•u;  of  -'> p•.o cuLJ t i V•;  · e Hpi tal 
nnd  tnr:t uu1c iub in  tu'IVtl 1L1u:Lti ty'i'  Th:i:;;  i.r:;  not v.  mn. t tur of 
doGtri.n.:d.rc  JH'inoipl~,  it  i,~c;  .\  mo.ttfo<r  of  common  G(;lHh::  and  C<Jtap,;tunc<:;., 
Somu  p<.;;OJ;l..:  nPc,. wonrlorin~:;,  novcr th•.:h;::;o,  whv th,;r  this  m;,~chinury 
:L3  iu  fw.::t  ;:uffil.li~,,nt;  to  cor;•.:  w:Lth  <J.  fr~~sh  cr:tGiG  l(otuJing  to"u frush 
f:'mrge  of  dol.lar.c;  in  to  t.h.;  l:omnuni ty.  !I ore  M1d  tlwt·c  tho  idea 3.:5 
b(dne;  r.;mu-r-cctdct  of  jointly  floating  tl1..:'  Community  currr;,ncieB. 
Now  flonting,  that  io1  cc~sin8 to  buy  dollars,  ±H  in  thu  proae~t 
stnte  of  the  j_ntcrnn.ti.onJ.l  1:1on:tary  system  tantamount  to  <:tcccpting  a 
furthvr  rcv<  ..  Ju::~tion of mont  :l..f  not all the  Community  eurrt::nciot:> 
· ag;;tirwt  th(·  dollar.  So  the  first question  that  arises  is  this:  are 
the  Comm~nity bountriea praparod  to  accopt  a  revalua~ion ove~ and  above 
the  onu  they  accepted  in  Dec0mb~r?  The  answer  depends  on  tho  size  of~ 
this  new  revnluation.  Would  it be  a  small  one  or  a  substantial  one? 
Nobody  knows.  At all evont.s,  recent  experience  has  shown  that  when 
you  set out  to  float  you  do  not  know  whvre  it is  going  to  take  you. 
I  remamber  ~hen I  made  this point  in  Nay  1971  I  was  assured  that  tho 
m~rk would  not  appreciate  by  more  than  5~.  We  all know  what  happened 
six months  later. 
Since  the  advocates  of  flouting  want all  tho  Community countries 
to  float  toguthur,  another  question at once  suggests  itself:  ~an ~11, 
Six  or  o.ll  'J\:,n,  bound  to  on,:)  another  by  stable,  realistic  exchange 
rates,  accept  ono  and  the  same  revaluation of  their currencies against 
the  dollar? 
Supposing  they could,  ~ third  que~tion arises:  sinca  some  of  th6 
Community  countries  cennot,  for  obvious  economic  and  social roasons 1 
afford  to  let their  currcnci~s appreci~tc too  much  in relation  to  the 
currencies  of  third  countri~s, is the  Community  as  a  whole  prepared  to 
launch  a  joint,  controlled float?  This  would  ~cccssarily involve 
concerted  int~rventions  by  the  Central  Banks  with  resp~ct to  the 
dollar,  which  would  me3n  havin~ to  build  up  a  very  large  strategic 
reserve  abl0  to  withatand  sp~culation,  and  in addition  an  effuctive 
Community  armoury  against  inflows  of hot  money. 
Fourth  ~nd last question:  if,·as is sometimes  argued,  the  dollar 
were  to  dcproci.:t te  sharply,  would  the  Commu.ni ty  be  pr<?par0d  to  safG-· 
guard its competitive  capacity  by  introducing  exchange  countervailing 
charges?  This  eminently logical  course  is  indeed  proposed  by  some  of 
those  who  favour  floating,  but  one  cannot  blink its implications. 
P0rsonally,  I  do  net  rul~ out  the possibilit~ of its being  neces-
sary, if mattors  should  so  J~v~lop that  there  is really nothing else 
for  it,  to  rosort  to  joint  flo~ting of  tho  Community  currencies,  but 
I  do  want  to  point  out  most  forcibly  that  for  this  to  have  any  prospect 
of  success  the- flo-::tt  would  need  to  be  a.  co:nt,...<> 1 led  on0  and  the  neces-. 
sary  means  o~ action  ready  tG  h~;,_:  otherwise  the  operation might 
easily end  v•:ry  quickly  in  :~o~inious  f~iluro, with  nighly regrettable 
economic,  political and  psych0logical  consequences.  So  far  frbm  its 
serving  to  speed  the  pace  of  European  monetary  unification,  the  result 
might  well  bu  to  bring  to  nothing all that has  been  done  up  to  now  to 
set  the  process  in motion. 
. ..  I ... - :  ..  -
ln  thr;  ~om:tnr;  W<h11W  ':mrl  mcntliG  Wv  t;}P.\11  h(,\',;  to li:'<.:  dtt11(~·:~~'()t1t'.io~y  _ 
on  _thi:;!  liloni; tii~i--y  l'1'on \~:.  And  th;~t -rnc:anl:i  it i.9  r:tbi'Jolut(,•ly  cs."Jvn tJ.f.Jl  t(')  c 
k .. ;.::p  our  h•.}ntL;. 
A::.' .l  IJ:,·{\  told  th._  Iiou:~-- ov.,r  ~<nd  ov(;l·  .::tg~aJ..n  in  th~..:  liwt  few 
<ye:<t'>3f  :Lt.  i~ -tJJ:  ... import:-llJt  in  '.;conomic  •J.nd  monot:::i.ry  nt;J,tt\:rs  hot  i.;o 
:lnuuJ.g""  in  wlshful  th:tnldne;,  not.  to  uurke  t!10  iasUv<.>,  not  tu  tnk.: 
wor-du  for  rL  cd.:.; • 
. 'ro  sum  up  nimply  v.nd  p.L.iuly:  it is  tlw  Commuuity 1 r;  intur;;:~3t  to 
,P!'Ufiel'V0  th.:.  ;,;true tllru  of  C:Xchttllg•J  rnb:s  Ut_;;re<>'cl  :in  ,,·;_\sl1i.n;;to:n  in 
Donumbcr;  nnd  to  pt·(~Vc:nt  ~tll.i  r_:'f·.·X'Gion  to  'l  stut.e  of  morlt':tclr;y  :J.nd 
.comm0rci~:~lc ~nnrchy hctrmful  t·:;  c-ur  oconomioa.  And  it is still more, 
tho  Community '.s  in  tGr~)s t  to  main to.in  c-tnd  r•.Jinforco  the  Community. 
monetary  ugroementst  in order  that  the  Common  Market  should  f11nction 
smoothly,  international  monetury  difficulties  be  handled  in  orderly 
fashion,  and  th0  way  left  op~n for  eccino~ic  and  monutary  union. 
'l'hia,  without  doubt,  i.:;  the  best  ;:i.nd  surest  way  to  ket:!p  the 
Community  together  now  and  in  the  futurd. 
- - - - - - - -
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:m~VANT LE  PARTAnMEN
1r  EUROPJDTDN  ( St  rasbou  rr~  1  tt  jui  11 et  1972) 
Pour apprec1er la situation actuelle  1  il  f<mt 1  a mon  sens,  distinrruer 
trois  problemas  r1ui  ne  sont  pas  de  m~me nature  :  le probl0me  dE:  la Livre 
sterlinc,  colui  des relations  de  change  intra-communautaires et celui  clu  dolla:r. 
Je ne  m' otenc1rai  pas  sur 1 es  causes  de  cctte situation.  Les  difficul  tr~s 
internes  de  1 1 6conomie l)ritannique  1  les  discussions  menr5os  en  Grande-Bretagne 
meme  sur un  evontuel  changement  rlo  parit6  de  la Li  vro  1  los  cloutes  cxprimes  par 
de  nombrcux milieux hritanniques sur la capac:Lte  de  leur pays  de  participer aux 
accords monetaires  communautaires,  ne  pouvaicnt  q11e  stimuler la speculation. 
li 1 arnpleur  de la pression specuJ_ative  1  qui  so  manif'osta.  on quelques  jours, 
s 1explique  par le role  que  tient la placo  d.o  Londres  dc-1.ns  les transactions finan-
cieres  internationales. 
J.~a  criso actuelle  de  la Livre sterlin,:; ne  saurai  t  do·w  etre tme  complete 
surpr:i.::.e~  Le  feu  comrait  sous la cendreo  Cet"t.8  crise montr.;;  clairemcnt  qu'on 
no  peut  igno:cor  ou eluder los problemes  economi(rues 1  moneta:ires  et  financiers  de 
la Grande~-Bret.agno et que  leur solution command.er::•.  1e:  bon  fonctionnement  et le 
developpemc>l'Yt  d.o  la Communaute  eJ.argic. 
l~a  Corr.munaute  a  pris acto avoo  oompr6bension  des  d~:.~cisions  que la Grande·-
:Bretagne  s'es-t  trouveo  contrainte  de  prendreo  Co  qui  importe  desormais,  c'est 
que la Grando-Breta~~ne puisse  cmtrer dans  la Communa.ute  au  debut  do  1973  avec 
1.:me  sit.ua-ti.on  de  change  norma1is8e  par rapport a ses  partenaireR. Elle devra 
alors trouver auprElS  des  a.utres  pays  membros  1 1a].cl,e  qui lui permr.:rttra  de  vE:mir 
progresr:Jivement  ii  bou-t  de  ses  difficu.ltes. 
L  I Irlande  f  etroHement  lieo sur le plan monetaire au RoyaUine-Uni'  ne  pouvai  t 
quo  s 1ali,·;sner  sur l'attitude britannique. 
Le  Danemark,  at.tx  prisos  avoc  des  difficul  tos  ::1-:;  balance des  paiements  7 
se retirai  t  tempon:ircrn·.:-:•1.t  de  1 1 accord  de  B§:J 0)  tc;;_+  ,::  ,Bp-Jctant  les accords 
de t·Jashington.  La Norv0ro;e,  pour  EJa  part,  maullcnai-t  tous  sos  engac;emonts. 
Qu' allaient faire los Six  ?  Ils  ont  decide  h  I,v.xombourt~: de  respecter 
1'  accord  de  l:lashing-i;on  sur les taux  do  chan:~e ot  do  maintonir les arrange-
ments  monO'tairef;  conclus  en mars  dernior au scin rk la Communaute* 
I 
o•..,/oat U11  pt<obHJmG  pu.rticmlic:r'  th)  poriatt  fi  l'lt.:tlie. l.o.  flottaj_uon de  la.  J.1iVJ".'e 
oxpoa:ti  t  0rT of!'ot  lh T  il'l:',  ita:lb:.rnho ft.  Ulie  F.lpoNllation ~~ ltt ba.isao ot  ~ d' imp-or;... 
tHntol';l  FJorties  do  cupit::t\lX•  La  situatl.on  it.n.l:immo,  +r&B  diff0:rcntB  do  l-:1 
situr::Uon anglnif.lc,  no  justifiait. pas  uno  flot.ta:i.Bon  do  la U.ro.  Certos,  __ 
l'lSoonomie  ii;~  .. lit.Hu1c  conn!\f.t  des.d.if"fietl.ltea  et  des  inc::;rtitudos  •  mats  la-
- li;:~lu.noc  dos  pe,i(11nents  d<~l'Italie eat  o:r.cedentair0,  les rcsorvosdc  e:c pays 
aont  u.i)ond.ant-~u,  loa  pri.x  f~  P  ex.portnti.oh  l~vo1'-lt:int  jusqu' ici  pli.H3  fn.vm'tt1)1emcut 
que  e'-mX do  scs  p:r•inc1ipa.ux  pal~ten:.tiroa  • 
Quanrl  Or1  r;otnpn.ro  loS  inconvonionts  limit8S qui  l'GSUJ.tent  do  18,  drrotation 
'Cf:::tnpornil'O  CWCOl~d.6c a 1 1lt<:.lic,  &\lX  irlconv6nients  C00110ffilC)'1.l.CS  ut  poJitiquos qui· 
:;~ura.i<:mt  result<~ do  l'n.bamlon de la 1nnx·ge  cle  2,25 % 1  0'1110  P~'Ut  q1te  se !'(ljvui:t• 
do  la sohrti.on intcrwmue.  JJa  d0ro{1o:tion  o.ccordce u 1 'Italic n'est  pas autre 
chose  qne  la  c_om~oc:ru.encc  d 1\:rne  sHu.a-tion de  fait  daris  laquello l'or des  banques 
con.-tralea  se trouve aot,;.ellement  gcle at ne  p0ut  r0mplir son role do  moyen  inter;;.. 
national  a  d.o  l'eglement • 
Est-co a cliro  que  d'  (:tutr€ls  difficul  tes no  se pr6scnteront  pas  d'J..ns  l 'nvenir ? 
Je  sc't'ai.s  le dernior O.lo  pr0tendre.  1-:ai.s  porsonne  n 1 a  jamais  cru quo  1'  orrg:mi-
sation moneto.irc  do  la Ccll11munau:t.e  s 
1 r;ffoctuer·ait  r:omme  par  onchantDmEmt o  Les 
m{cani.smcs  prevus  par les  ('l.ccords  d.e  Btn e  ont  5te  solgne-usemont  conGus  :  ils 
peuvent  fonctionne:c  entJ'G  los Sixi  mn.is  SGl1_lem-:rDt  a condition que  les Etats 
ffiOHlbt'(;)B  aient la Vvlont.c  de  d~~fe!ldre lfi  SVStOmG  R;l'aCe  a Ui'lO  etroite Soliclari  to. 
,91...:-._~el J. ~t  i  ci.££....11~~:-· /.- · 
~  On  no  rcp(rtGro.  jo.mais  o.asoz  que si lo.  spec·"tlo.t ion  ga[;Tie  ai. uouwmt,  c' est  part>.:.  / 
lc front  qni lui est  oppose  craqu::ra  :  .La- sp0culn.tion ost loin d f etl'e irration-
nello  ..  Pom.'quci  so  pl'i  vurai  t:..e:lle  de  fC!.il'o  un profit,  si olJ e  a  toutos  chances 
de reussir a 1 1 ottonir  ?  Pou:rquoi  croirait-QJ.lc a la solidite tl'un accord.•  si 
rllo sa:i.t  qu'au premier  chbc ceJui-ci sera rcmis  en  question et si elle consta-!ie 
c:;,ue  les partici:!)ants  8.  1 '!1ccord oux-memes  ne  croient  pas a sa cluree  ? 
·A  Luxembourg,  les Six Etats membres  ont  adrninistr6 la preuve  qu' ils ne 
voulaient  pas  rovenir sur ee qu'ils avaient  decide  d'cntrep't'endre trois rnois 
plus tot• L'.fl.venir  depend d'uno  semblabh~ determina:tion de leur part. 
Ce  que  je viens  de  dir'e  vaut  egalement  pour  l-38  accords  de  lrJashin.q;ton, 
o' est-a-dire pour le probleme  du  dollar. Si les accords  do  Hashington ont 
cepenchnt  ete  conoluFJ,  c' est parco  qu  1 ils muttaient  m1  terme a une  eituation 
dewonu(~ inte:nableo  Les  pe,ys  qui  a.vaient  _J.a.iss6  flatter leur monnaie  s 1 ipquiotEdent 
.de  plus  en plus de  l 1apprec.iation de  leur taux  de  change  par rapport  au dollar 
oo11.x  qui  ava.ient  :repondu a des  controles  so voyaient  sans  cesse contraints  de 
los  renforoero 
1Ious  on ctaient  venus  a so  ronclre  compte  de  l'importance qu'il 
y avait a sta'blir  t<t  a prosorvcr 1,tne  st.ructu.re stable de taux de  change  re<.:;.listes 
qni  pouvont  etre ajuates  de  frt90Yl  ordonnee  .. 
Veut-on maintenant  renoncer a l'ordre monetai:re  encore fragile que l'on 
s'est efforce  de  restaurer ? 
Est-il a ce  point,  impossible  de  defendro  les taux  rlr..  chanze  eta1)1is  en 
docombre  dornier  en u+.i lisant a vldn la.  m;::o.  ;e  ~largie de  fluct··.J.ation  a 1'  e::;2.rd 
du  dollar·,  on  rnanie:nt  les tau:x:  d~ into '~t  et  ~n nppliquant  los  divers  instruments 
qui  permettent  do  rr~duiro l'afflux d"'s  c;:pitaux sponulatifs  ot  d'a;;ir sur la 
liquidite int6riouro  dos  eCOXiOmies  ?  Co  n 1est  pas  uno affaire de  d.o,<;ma,  mais  de 
bon  s ens  et  d' effi  cD.ci teo- · 3 
Col"i.uintl so  d0llmndoht  ct1nond.aut  si c.:l  diopus:i.tif oor:lit  suffiaant. pm:.r 
fRi  "t"c  fndc  h  un.:;  ·nmw(.;llo  l'll'l.~Jr:  prv\r&run.fH  un  dL!fJrlc·ltdli: 00 d0llnt·a  ::iiu:  J.a 
C0mli1l\l'l:.\trl;,j.  th'l  \'OH  :l.oi  ~\.J.  Ut  T'CB\'r;r,h•  1 'id.f-o  cJo  J.r..  fJ ott.:'l.:i.e6n  r:on:Joit>tc  dc.-:s 
mnr;nniuf:\  \.h1  ln Cot'unUl:'Jn.tlt<'i. 
Pl<:lttor,  o'ur,rt-a-dil:'o  (;Csso:r  d''l.oh(fhol'  des  dollc.r!3t  r:'·JSt  on 11,$'tt;,t 
arrt\1ol  ("u  Dyst ~~mc1  morditrii:ro  itrt  o:r.nn.t i ona1 1  t,.coc.pto:e  uno  riouvollo r(:cval nut  :i. on 
d·:J  lt~  nlu11r.n't  d.es  rnonnaii'!s  do  la  Comm~ma\At  6 t  r.linon  de  t01.rtos 1  pnr rapport  e.u 
doll::l'•  I~n  premi(n·o  qnos't1 011  qui SO  l)\)80  est  rtonr:  le.  r;nli.vanto  ;  1  OS  payfl  dn 
ltt  Commt,nn.ut6  nont-ils pl'cts  h  artmottro  uno  r(}6v[iluc.tion  q'ti viondratt  s 'ajm.1to1· 
ii  (!Ollo  qu' ils ont  consGntio  dej\ en  d\~oom1jre  d<:rPnior  ?  On  pcnrt  (1i.re qu•;  lr.' 
l?.JpOHSr'!  h  00tto C[UCStion  c1.0pond  do  ). I importance  do  ootte llOUVOllC  rer~ya,lun.tion, 
Sora-t-olle modoste  01.1.  scr:.sible  ?  Pc:rsonno  n' en  pout  :rio11  dire.  l!~n  tout  cas, 
1'  i;:Xp<~!'li3l1CO  feCOHGO  rnontre  qUO  lO!'SqUO  1 I 011  0 t Ol1f.."U{{O  Cl::i.nS  la VOiG  de  lo, 
flottaisonf  on  s.rxit  d' ou  1 1 on part,  mais  on  nc  snit  pf.l,s  ou  1 'on arrive,  Je 
me  souviens quo  J.orsqu0  jo ·tenais  cvs  prop:)s  em  wai  1971,  on  m' expliqw:d  t 
quo  l  r:  deutsche 1/larlc  no  s 1 apprecicrai  t  pas  do  plus  clc  5  f,.,  On  sait ce  qui 
adv:Lnt  six mois  plus  turd~ 
Comma  les partis:;vns  do  la..  flott~.ison souhrd.'b-:mt  uno  flotte,ison conjoin·te 
des  monnaies  do  la Communaute,  uno  soconcl.o  question so  pose A.ussitot  :  los 
Six ou les Dix,  lies on·tre  ou..'C  par des  tc.ux  de  chanr,e  ste.blcs  at  rcalistes, 
pouvont-iJ.s tous accepter Ul1  m0me  tam:  do  reevaluation do  lear monnaie  l~  1'  o:·;ard 
du dollar ? 
A supposor qu':i.l  en soit ainsi,  uno  troisieme question se pose  : 
comma:  certains  pays  rle  la ·Cornnn.t.rtn.u.t6  no  peuvcmt. 1  pottr  des  raisons  6conomiquos 
e-t  socialcs  ovid.entcs,  prendre 1e risque  d'une  a.pp:ceciation -Grop  forte  cto 
lour mom'lc':l.ie  a 1 1 ogard do  monnaics  de  pays tiors  1  la Commtmautc  dans  son 
onocmble  c:st-elle pret'e a pratiqner une fl  uctuativr1  0onjoi~te et  contro16e  ? 
Cello-ci  dovrai  t  nomportor. cleo  interventions  concert  6os  do  nos  bang:u.es 
ceni;ralos  sur J.e  cl.onar1  co qui  implique la constitution d'une  trf)S  irnportante 
masse  (tC  manoeuvre  capo.blo  de briser la. speculation,  et,  on  outre7  un disposi-
tif oor:1munautaire  efficacc do lutte centre l'afflu.x de  capitaux speculatifs. 
Qu..'J.trieme  ot  derniera  q11estio:n  :  an cas  ou7  comme  on lc pretend parfois, 
le dollar viendrai  t  2.  so depr6der fort ement 7 lu Communaute  seraH-ellc preto 
a pl'otGger sa capaoi  te  de  concurrcmce  en  int:r.oduisr-n:tt  des  ta...~es  compenso,toires 
de  cb.ang'0 1  r: 
1 est la proposition. tres lor;ique  quo  font  certains partisans  de 1a 
flottaison,  mais  on  en mosure  los  lmpJ.ice.tions" 
• 
Ponr rna  part1  je  n'exc~LUS pas  a.  priori au'il  faille~  s~L  le:s  E:vonoments 
no  la.issont  pas  tl' 3.Utres  issues,  r0courir u une  fluctuat),on  conjo:i.ntc  des 
monnaios  delE\.  Communo.ut6,  rnai..s  jo  sot~hr\ito atti:r•0r fortemont  l 1e.ttcntion 
sv.r  le fait  qu.'\mo  tcllo formulo n'a do  chances  de  succes  que s'il s 1at:;·it 
d'uno  fluctuation controlee et  st los moyens  cl'action n0cessaires  sont 
rcunif3o  :3inon,  on risque  d 1assisi;er e.n  peu  de  temps  a UYl.O  delJamJ.acle,  dont  los 
cffGts  (~conomiquos,  poli  tiquoo  ot  psyoholoc;iques  ser0ient  ffichcux  ..  Au  licJU 
que  l'unifioation monetairo  do  l 'Europe s'  en trouve  accCler-5e,  to·.1s  les efforts 
faits  jusqn  t ici  pOUJ'  1 ~  cntrcp:;.~r;ndrn  1  !'i ~,·;-.,(ora.ien-11  u' GlirC;  rcdni'ts  ~l,  neant • 
Dans  los  p:t·ochainos  scmt:.incs  et  dn.ns  los prochains  mois,  il faudra vi  vre 
dan~pruusommrt sur le plan monetai:::'e  :  c' est  0.i:t.'o  quo  lo plus  grand sang froid 
s 1 ir.1poso. 
' 4 -
Con'lmo  jo  11' n.i  jawdo  ncano  rlo  le <lil'o  T;.\1\  Parlonwnt  r:\.U  /'](;U't'B  do  cos 
tlGl'hi~l't~S  m111ooa 1 il  Cc>lWiont  1:\Vtt.nt  tout p<mr 'C<J  q1\i  oonrr.)J'nc;  loa  r.ffo.iro:J 
drl<.•non;.l<TU\l!il  ~.,..t;  !IIOntHnh•eo_,  do  no  lX\G  cod:Jl:>  oxt..'t  i.ll'.tsicms,  dc,  rw  po.~;  rt6q!l.rno~O/.\ 
los  f.ll'v1'l;.;m~h),  (tl,~vitor lt, :"'uHc  {m  avcw:rt;  puromont  vo1'1xil0. 
Mo,  conohiaf(\fl.  Aol'n  clai  ro.  L 
1 i11t &rot  G
3.c  18.  Commnnr.mt 0  •.H3t  do  sn,uV<\'?;<.trdor 
l:\  s't:ructtn'<l  dos  tau  ..  x  do  ohango  de's  m,)nnrdest 6tahl:i.o  on dooornhra  dor.nicr i't 
Wf\.Bhine;ton  o;t  rh!l  voillor  lL  :no  pas  :rctombor  dlJXls  11110  ano:~ch:io rilonctai:-:'G  ot 
oomrn<n'ci.nlc  qui.  serait p:r6jud.ioittblo ;\nos  ~oon9mios~> Plus  encore,  1'  ini;erot 
do  lc D(>;mnunrw.tc  o~:rt  do  tnaintonir ct  do  ronforc(:rr 1Gs  acco~'ds mori..1taircti  ·  · 
comrm.':.na:t.ttairos  pm.n~ pe:rmv't"tro  lo bon  f'onotionnonH:lnt  du L1archo  commun,  pour 
fo.iro  fo.co  do }'a90n  ordonnG9  o.ux  cliffioult6s rnon0taires  in't(rrno,tionaler:J,  pour 
go.rdor  808  chancGS  h  l'tmio:n QOOnomiquo  ot  mone'tairc. 
C'ost  sans  donto  la fagon la plus  s{h."c  d 1assuror avjouX'd'hui  et  il.  to1mo 
lu coh0sion  c:lc  no.tro  Commt:.nautoo 